Transforming the trade and industrialization regime in developing countries by Dijck, P.van
SERIE RESEARCH mEmORIMDn 
TRANSFORMING THE TRADE AND INDUS-
TRIALIZATION REGIME IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Pitou van Dijck 
Researchmemorandum 1987-5 januari 87 
VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT 
FACULTEIT DER ECONOMISCHE WETENSCHAPPEN 
A M S T E R D A M 

TRANSFORMING THE TRADE 
AND INDUSTRIALIZATION REGIME 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
the approaoh of the World•Bank 
Pitou van Dijck 
Economie and Social Institute 
Free University of Amsterdam 
Paper prepared for the seminar of the 
EADI working group Industrial 
Development in the Third World, 
Royal Tropical Institute, Amsterdam 
January 9-10, 1987 
XX. 
CONTENTS page 
1. INTRODUCTION 1 
2. INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION OF PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS 2 
3. GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION AND THE TRADE REGIME 4 
4. THE PREFERENCE FOR PROTECTION 7 
5. EFFECTS OF PROTECTION 10 
6. EXPORT PROMOTION POLICIES 12 
7. EXPORT ENCLAVES 13 
8. SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON REGIME TRANSFORMATION 17 
9. THE WORLD BANK APPROACH TO REGIME TRANSFORMATION 19 
NOTES 33 
. 1 _ 
TRANSFORMING THE TRADE AND INDUSTRIALIZATION REGIME IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
the appvoach of the World Bank 
Pitou van Dijck 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In many developing countries the prevailing system of incentives stimulates 
production for the domestic market and hampers export production. Transforma-
tion of the incentive system is required to enhance the efficiency of 
resource allocation and to stimulate foreign-exchange earnings. This study 
focuses on World Bank recommendations to change the trade and industrializa-
tion regime in developing countries. The World Bank has a long history of 
monitoring the economie performance of countries and the conduct of govern-
ments. During the past few years, its rol e in policy formulation has become 
more predominant in heavily indebted developTng countries. For that reason 
the Bank's perceptions of optimal trade and industrialization policies are 
of increasing consequence for the future course of industrial development 
and trade in developing countries as well as developed countries. 
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 deal briefly with patterns 
in the market orientation of the'manufacturing sector in the course of 
development and with government intervention in the trade sector. Sections 
4 and 5 deal more particularly with the preference for protection and the 
impact of protection on the market orientation of the manufacturing sector. 
In section 6 we distinguish avenues to transform an inward-oriented incentive 
regime for industrial development into a more open or export-oriented regime. 
Section 7 deals with one such avenue, the creation of export enclaves. In 
section 8 some general observations are made on the second and more comprehen-
sive avenue to transform the trade and industrialization regime. Section 9 
focuses on the World Bank approach to regime transformation as reflected 
in World Bank country studies of 17 developing countries. 
- 2 -
INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION OF PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS 
In the initial stage of industrialization, production i's predominantly 
oriented towards the domestic market. This is due to inherent difficulties 
in entering foreign markets and to the industrialization and trade strategies 
pursued in most countries during the infant stage of industrialization which 
favours import substitution over export production. An import-substitution 
strategy results in a fairly rapid industrial transformation of the domestic 
economy in the initial stage of industrialization. Three causes of industrial 
growth may be distinguished in this stage: (1) growth of domestic demand for 
manufactures, which is relatively high because of the high elasticity of 
demand for manufactures at low levels of income per capita; (2) substitution 
for products initially produced by the domestic handicraft sector; (3) sub-
stitution for imports, which is stimulated by import barriers. The first two 
are "natura!" causes, inherent in the process of growth and transformation, 
while the third brings in the government as a lever. In genera!, export of 
manufactures is a relatively late phenomenon. In the course of time, the 
contribution of import substitution to growth decreases and, once certain 
preconditions are fulfilled, exports can create a new momentum for the 
process of industrialization.1 
The increasing export orientation of the manufacturing sector and the rising 
share of manufactures in total exports of goods are not merely the inherent 
outcomes of a "normal" process of growth and transformation. They result as 
well from shifts in pursued industrialization and trade strategies. There 
are wide differences between countries in industrialization and trade 
strategies adopted, and such differences are at least in part related to 
differences in structural characteristics of the economies. Nevertheless, 
it goes for most developing countries that more recently implemented industrial 
development strategies emphasize the contribution of the manufacturing 
sector to export production and include specific instruments to stimulate 
export-oriented industries. This revision of strategies was called for in 
order to abolish some of the inherent limitations of more inward-oriented 
industrialization strategies, as pursued in the past, and to reduce dis-
advantages of foreign-exchange dependence on primary commodities. 
For many traditional export commodities of developing countries, market pros-
pects are poor, as compared to market prospects for manufactured exports. 
This is due to low income elasticities of demand for (consumable) primary 
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products in importing high-income countr ies, subst i tu t ion fo r primary prod-
ucts of man-made mater ia ls , increas-ing e f f ic iency in processing industr ies 
and barr iers to imports of.primary products i n developed countr ies. As 
export-earnings form a major souce of income to finance imports of goods 
and services that are v i t a l to the continuation and acceleration of growth, 
po l ic ies are required to st imulate non-t radi t ional exports. The aggravation 
of debt-servicing problems has fur ther stressed the need to enhance the 
capacity to generate addit ional foreign-exchange earnings. For that reason, 
some countries promote exports of primary goods or manufactured products, 
other countries stimulate migrants' remittances, and s t i l ! other countries 
stimulate internat ional tourism, banking services or off-shore serv ic ing. 
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3. GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION AND THE TRADE REGIME 
The process of industrialization in developing countries has been accompanied 
by a varying number of policy measures with an impact on the sector's size, 
structure and market orientation. These policy measures have not necessarily 
been part of a consistent and deliberately designed industrialization 
strategy but have often been prompted by ad hoc economie or politial 
necessities. 
The issue at stake here is not government intervention as such. As wil! be 
substantiated below, it is the type of government intervention rather than 
the extent of it which is typical of developing countries. Laissez-faive , or 
government abstinence from intervention, is a rare phenomenon in both devel-
oped and developing countries. The distinction between the two groups of 
countries is in the way the government sector is financed and domestic 
activities are stimulated. Intervention in the foreign-trade sector is much 
more predominant in developing countries than in developed countries. This 
is not to say that there is no scope for trade liberalization in developed 
countries. On the contrary, developed countries stimulate domestic production 
and hamper imports in a number of sectors that are often of special interest 
to developing countries, using many different devices among which are tan'ff 
and non-tariff barriers. Protection of agriculture and of labour- and capita!-
intensive decaying industries is a case in point. Nevertheless, the dependence 
of manufacturing industry on protection against imports, and of government 
revenue on taxes on international trade is substantially higher in developing 
countries than in developed countries. 
The point made above is illustrated in figure 1 that shows the share of 
taxes in GDP as a proxy for government intervention in the economy, and the 
ratio of import duties to total imports as a proxy for government intervention 
in the trade regime. In the diagram, developed countries are indicated by A 
and developing countries by *. To be sure, it is not really possible to 
capture the effects of the entire system of trade barriers in a single 
variable. However, the only trade-policy-related data available for a large 
number of countries are data on government revenue from taxes on trade. 
Therefore, when analyzing the rol e of trade intervention, we have to use 
revenue from import duties as a proxy for the entire system of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers to imports. 
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Figure 1. Duties on imports and taxes in GDP, 1980. 
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Symbols: developed countries indicated by A, developing countries indicated 
by *. 
Souvees: data on GDP taken from UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and 
Development Statistics, Supplement 1983, United Nations, New York, 1983, 
table 6.1, and United Nations, Yeavbook of National Accounts Statistics 1981, 
Volume I, New York, 1983. 
Data on government revenue and import dufcy revenue taken from IMF, 
Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, Volume VIII, Washington DC, 1984. 
Exchange rates taken from IMF, International Financial Statistics, 
volume XXXVII, Number 11, Washington DC, 1984. 
The role of import duties in government finance and in the stimulation of 
domestic activities in countries at different levels of development and with 
different opportunities for domestic-market-oriented poli ei es is studied in 
a cross-section analysis. We expect that countries at higher levels of devel-
opment have a bureaucratie and financial infrastructure that facilitates 
alternative ways of tax collection and subsidy of domestic activit ies. The 
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application of such alternative instruments is often not feasible for coun-
tries at low levels of development. The capability of building up an 
efficiënt tax and subsidy system is interrelated with the.overall level of 
development of a country. The options for government to manage the economy 
cannot be seen in isolation from the overall financial and bureaucreatic 
infrastructure of the country, its system of Communications, the literacy 
rate, to mention only a few variables. Additionaly, we expect that, 
especiaily in the early stages of development, manufacturing industry suffers 
from inadequacies in the genera! environment, lacks knowledge derived from 
experience and consequently needs more support to survive foreign competi-
tion. The resuits of the regression analyses, presented in table 1, indicate 
that the lower the level of development of a country, the higher import 
duties, the larger the contribution of taxes on international trade and 
other international transactions to total tax revenue, and the more govern-
ment is dependent on import duties for its total revenue. 
Table 1. Taxes on international transactions, protection and government 
revenue, 1980. 
Dependent 
variables 
Constant 
term 
GDP/P P n R2 
f/M 3.75* 
(3.32) 
-.67* 
(6.7*9) 
-.15 
(1.94) 
68 .42 
f/T 7.95* 
(6.90) 
-.86* 
(8.56) 
-.39* 
(4.85) 
68 .57 
f/GR 6.66* 
(6.21) 
-.82* 
(8.75) 
-.33* 
(4.42) 
68 .57 
Symbols: GDP/P = Gross Domestic Production per aapita in US dollars. 
P = size of population in thousands of inhabitants. 
f/M = ratio of total import duty revenue (f) to the value 
, of total imports (M). 
T /T = contribution of taxes on international trade and trans-
actions (T ) to total tax revenue (T). 
ï/GR = contribution of import duty revenue (x ) to total govern-
ment revenue (.GR) . 
Notes: equations are in doublé Z-n-form. The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
An asterisk (*) indicates that the variable is statistically significant at 
a 95 per cent confidence interval. 
Souraes: as of figure 1. 
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4. THE PREFERENCE FOR PROTECTION 
For a number of reasons there is a strong preference-in many developing 
countries for government intervention in the trade sector over different 
forms of government intervention in market forces. Intervention in market 
forces may be required to stimulate an industry in its infant stage or to 
obtain a required level of production externalities, to correct market 
imperfections or to contribute to the fulfilment of other specific objectives 
of economie policy, the so-called non-economic arguments for intervention. 
The reasons for the apparent preference for protection over stimulation 
with alternative instruments may be practical or politica! by nature. It 
is reasonable to assume that taxes on foreign trade have relatively "low 
collection costs as compared to alternative tax anm subsidy systems because 
of the high concentration of international trade at only a limited number 
of economie agents in a few locations. Differences in collection costs may 
turn a tariff system into a favourable intervention system in spite of 
the distortions it brings about. Additionaly, application of alternative 
intervention systems may not be feasible for countries at low levels of 
development, as noted earlier. An elaborate system of subsidization pre-
supposes the functioning of a sophisticated network of tax collection and 
subsidy disbursements. Thus,compared to a system of protection against 
imports, a system of subsidization may be costly and complex. Restriction 
of imports by means of tariffs or quotas causes the domestic price level 
of imported and domestically produced substitutes to rise, so that 
automatically domestic consumers are taxed and producers subsidized. 
Apart from the relatively low costs and the relative simplicity of a system 
of trade intervention, there may also be politica! factors that favour a 
system of protection over alternative forms of government intervention. 
Above, government was conceived of as a kind of exogenous institution, having 
perfect insight in the functioning of markets and operating as a benevolent 
force for the so!e purpose of maximizing welfare for society at large. 
This proposition, however, does not necessarily adequately reflect the actual 
way in which governments operate. Government has a monopoly position in 
society in the formulation of poli ei es and the application of instruments 
which have pecuniary effects on groups in society. This may and wil 1 induce 
groups in society to advocate policies that favour their interest. Such 
lobbying activities of groups involve the allocation of resources in order 
to obtain the revenue created by the application of specific instruments 
- 8 -
such as subsidies, tariffs, quotas and production and import licenses. Thus, 
interest groups that demand protection compete in the politica! market with 
groups that are interested in other poli ei es.2 Specific demands for protec-
tion made by interest groups may be supported by other groups that do not 
have an ad hoc interest in the specific case at all. Mutual support in 
lobbying activities in favour of protection may emerge in circumstances 
when protection is conceived of as an "insurance policy". The politica! 
behaviour of the supporting groups is one of solidarity for the sake of 
se!f-interest. 3 When society has come to be characterized by a conservative 
welfare function in which income stabiüty or job security has become one 
of society's objectives included in the welfare function, domestic support 
for specific demands for protection may be widespread.4 Government, in its 
turn, is also assumed to pursue its self-interest which may be regarded 
as an interest in survival. The relationship between government and constitu-
ency may take many different forms. In an undistorted democracy, government's 
survival is determined by the outcome of votes. In almost al! cases, however, 
not merely group size but the economie and organizational strength of groups 
as well determine their impact on the chances of government to survive. As a 
consequence, for the sake of its own survival, a government may opt to pursue 
policies that do not purely reflect the preferences of society at large. In 
case the outcome of this process of policy formulation in a distorted politi-
ca! market is protection, this outcome may not be optima! in terms of national 
welfare but may be desirable both for the government in terms of political 
support and for some interest groups that appropriate the revenue created 
by protection. 
A system of trade barriers may have the political advantage for government 
of taxing its citizens in a less perceptible way while, at the same time, 
such a system of taxation stimulates specific domestic industries. Such a 
system of concealed taxation may contribute to a government's popularity 
and consequently to its chances to survive. As the implicit subsidy to 
industry is not part of the government budget in-the case of trade barriers 
(as it is in alternative subsidy programmes), it is less likely to be 
scrutinized frequently, which is an attractive features to the protected 
industry. 
An unfavourable external position may add to the economie and political at-
tractiveness of protection. To reduce trade deficits in the short term, gov-
erments tend to apply quantitative import restrictions rather than increase 
tariff rates, since the effect of the former type of import control is more 
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predictable. The benefits of import licenses may accrue to rent-seeking 
firms. Such measures to control imports may further be supported widely by 
domestic producers of import substitutes in case of an overvalued exchange 
rate. Such a position of the exchange rate has, in fact, often been the ra-
tionale for the imposition of quantitative restrictions. An overvalued ex-
change rate creates a climate highly conducive to the formation of coali-
tions of interest groups in support of protection against imports. Under 
such circumstances all import-competing firms (and also export firms) - not 
only infant industries and the least efficiënt firms - seek government 
assfstance. Thus, governments and groups in society are dependent on the 
prevailing system of government intervention for the realization of their 
goals. Changing the trade regime, therefore, may have significant economie 
and politica! consequences. The more a country's trade regime is characterized 
by import restrictions, the greater resistance to liberalization is expected 
to be. 
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5. EFFECTS OF PROTECTIQN 
From the point of view of the export performance of the manufacturing sector, 
the most obvious difference between stimulation through protection against 
imports and through subsidies is the home-market bias in production which re-
sults from the application of import barriers. While a system of across-the-
board subsidization of industries would favour industries producing for the 
domestic and foreign markets over the non-industrial sectors which are taxed 
to finance the subsidy, a system of barriers to imports of manufactures fa-
vours import-competing industries over exporting industries and the non-
industrial sector. A system of import barriers may stimulate industrializa-
tion and diversification in developing countries and may assist in changing 
the traditional international division of labour between developed and devel-
oping countries. But it discourages production expansion by means of export 
production and retards change in the structure of exports. This may explain 
why structural change in exports is a relatively late phenomenon in the pat-
tern of development of developing countries, which can only be brought about 
after the initial industrial incentive system has been transformed or adapted. 
Developing countries that have applied a rigorous industrial. incentive system 
by means of import-restrictive policies for a considerable period are thus 
characterized by a relatively high leve! of industrialization and a tradi-
tional structure of exports. This is especially true of developing countries 
with a large domestic market. Tab!e 2 shows the results of an empirical 
investigation into the effect of duties on imports on the market orientation 
of manufacturing production. 
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Table 2. Protection, import substitution and the anti-export bias in manu-
facturing production, 1977. 
Dependent 
variables 
Constant 
term 
DD 
m 
f/M 
m 
E 
M /DD 
m m 
1.03* 
(10.66) 
-0.07* 
(8.27) 
-0.05* 
(3.53) 
54 0.57 
E /O 
m m 
0.39* 
(4.09) 
-0.01 
(1.71) 
-0.05* 
(4.10) 
54 0.25 
Symbols: M /DD a
 mm 
E /O 
m m 
= ratio of the value of manufactured imports (M ) to the value 
f/M 
m 
m 
to the value 
of domestic demand for manufactures (DD ). 
DD = 0 - E + M . m 
m m m m 
ratio of the value of manufactured exports 
of manufacturing production (0 ). 
ratio of total import duty revenue (T ) to the value of 
manufactured imports (M ). 
(V 
Notes: equations are in semi Z-n-form. The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
An asterisk (*) indicates that the variable is statistically significant at 
a 95 per cent confidence interval. 
Souroes: data on values of manufactured imports and exports taken from UNCTAD, 
Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistioss Supplement 1980, 
United Nations-, New York, 1980, table 6.1 A. 
Data on values of manufacturing output taken from United Nations, learbook of 
Industrial Statistios, 1981 Edition, Volume I, New York, 1983. 
Data on import duty revenue taken from IMF, Government Finanoe Statistios 
learbook, Volume VIII, Washington DC, 1984. 
Exchange rates taken from IMF, International Financial Statistios, 
Volume XXXIV, Number 11, Washington DC, 3 981. 
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6. EXPORT PROMOTION POLICIES 
The new models of international competition implemented in an increasing num-
ber of developing countries deviate strongly from the laissez-faire model 
and the free-trade model. Rather than implementing across-the-board liberaliza-
tion, a dual incentive system is frequent!y applied, protection being given 
to industries producing for the domestic market while, at the same time, 
export industries are stimulated through compensating facilities or by making 
them operate in an enclave, i.e. in isolation from the rest of the manufacturing 
sector. 
Here, we distinguish three avenues that may be pursued to stimulate exports 
of manufactures: 
(1) creation of export enclaves that operate independently of the rest of 
the manufacturing sector; 
(2) export stimulation through a transformation of an initially inward-
oriented trade and industrialization regime or through a further extension 
of trade-stimulating policies; 
(3) fostering of domestic processing of primary exports. 
The third avenue, however, is not so much a strategy entirely distinct from 
the second avenue, but rather a somewhat special option re.lated to the 
specific natura!-resource endowment of countries. 
These strategies should not be seen as mutually exclusive in all respects. 
Rather, the different strategies relate (at least in part) to different sub-
sectors of the manufacturing sector at large that require different incentive 
schemes and also differ in their impact on the exporting economy in terms of 
employment creation and foreign-exchange earnings. Hence, they can be applied 
simultaneously, with varying emphasis on either. The differentiation between 
export strategies, made here, is based on studies by Helleiner, Stewart, 
Lal! and Streeten, and Dunning.5 
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7. EXPORT ENCLAVES 
In view of the iïiefficiency of domestic industry andits inability to over-
come barriers to enter world markets, and because of the economie and politi-
ca! obstacles to a comprehensive transformation of the trade and industriali-
zation regime, implementation of a dual industrialization strategy is an at-
tractive option for many governments. In this context, the most extreme devi-
ation from a free-trade model is the combination of a protected (domestic) 
sector, producing for the domestic market, and an isolated export sector, 
dominated by foreign firms that operate in an EPFZ. 
A major "advantage" of this particular export-oriented industrialization 
strategy is that export production can be initiated without adaptation or 
transformation of the regime of protection for firms producing for the domes-
tic market. The implementation of a dual system of incentives allows a con-
tinuation of protectionist industrialization policies or the retarded imple-
mentation of a liberalization and restructuring process required to increase 
the efficiency and competitiveness of domestic manufacturing industry. 
While second- or next-best stimulation policies continue, manufactured exports 
may start to generate foreign-exchange earnings and employment opportunities. 
In view of the many economie and politica! difficulties involved in regime 
transformation, this export strategy is an attractive option for governments. 
Additionally, countries may resort to an EPFZ to remove obstacles that other-
wise might obstruct the expansion of non-traditional exports. The obstacles 
referred to here may be summarized as follows. First, the country may be 
an efficiënt and competitive producer of a range of products for which foreign 
demand is limited or for which the income elasticity of demand in high-income 
countries is low. Linder and Stewart both stress the differences in the struc-
ture of domestic demand and domestic production in countries at different 
levels of income per capita.* Developing countries, being competitive in the 
production and export of products for which there is an extensive market in 
low-income countries, may be incapable of producing efficiently the range and 
quaüty of products in demand in high-income countries, as domestic demand 
for- such products is insufficiënt to back up an efficiënt domestic industry. 
Second, penetration into foreign markets may be hampered by marketing and 
distribution problems. Extensive market reconnaissance, creation of goodwill 
and development of marketing and distribution systems are necessary pre-
conditions f.or successful export performance. Third, foreign-market penetration 
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may be hampered by import restrictions and regulations. The system of protec-
tion in developed countries has grown more complex and opaque with the in-
creasing importance of nonrtariff barriers and the application of a wide 
variety of regulations that are (veiled) devices to impede imports. The 
restrictions may create unsurmountable barriers for industries in developing 
countries to enter foreign markets. 
A country may try to overcome these obstacles to entering foreign markets by 
encouraging foreign firms to set up export-oriented production lines. These 
firms possess the production technology, they are familiar with the import 
markets, they have at their disposal international distribution systems and 
they may even be in a position to influence trade poliei es by lobbying in 
their home countries. In this way, EPFZs may create the opportunity for the 
host country to expand its exports. 
A major drawback of export stimulation in enclaves is that its contribution 
to overall economie growth of the host country's economy is limited, for the 
following reasons. First, as almost all capital goods and intermediate inputs 
are imported, production in the enclave does not generate substantial back-
ward-linkage effects to other firms within or outside the zone. This is an 
outstanding example of what Hirschman cal led the "antiseptically linkage-free 
enclave industry.7 Second, the domestic value-added component in output that 
contributes to domestic development is small as profits are allowed to be re-
mitted and taxes are non-existent or only limited, at least in the initial 
period. The wage component of value added thus appears to be the 'major con-
tribution to domestic income and foreign exchange. Production in EPFZs is 
concentrated in a number of sectors that are characterized by relatively 
low wages per employee. According to UNCTAD, the domestic value-added com-
ponent in exports in EPFZ is normally below 25 per cent, 70 per cent or more 
of which is wage income.8 Third, the contribution to technological develop-
ment is limited. Production is concentrated in standardized processes within 
an international intra-sectoral pattern of specializatioh. The ski 11 
intensity of these processes is low. High labour turnover rates, as 
a result of using young, unmarried female labourers and using apprentice-
ship contracts, add to this. As formulated by Edgren: "the notion that 
EPFZs could serve as 'nurseries' for the development of industrial ski lis 
has not been borne out by'experience".9 Finally, it is likely that in the 
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use of the infrastructure, set up by the government of the host country, a 
subsidy is involved, which reduces the net benefits of the activities in 
the zone to the host country. Competition among developing countries to 
attract foreign investors in export enclaves tends to l.ower tax revenue 
and to increase subsidization of production.10 
Tab!e 3 lists the countries in which EPFZs were in operation or were planned 
or under development in 1980. At that time, 57 zones in 30 developing coun-
tries were in operation and 34 zones in 19 countries were planned or under 
development. The list does not include Singapore and Hong Kong, which can be 
regarded as enclave-like export economies, Bermuda and the Bahamas, where two 
EPFZs were in operation, and Puerto Rico, which also can be regarded as an 
enclave-like export economy. Apart from the four EPFZs in China that were set 
up in Shenzen, Zhuhai, Shantou (Swatow) and Xiamen (Amoy) in 1980, 14 more 
Chinese cities on the Pacific border have been opened for foreign investment 
and trade si nee 1984. 
As follows from the tab!e, the zones are concentrated in two regions: Central 
America and the Caribbean, and East and South-East Asia. The establishment 
of EPFZs is apparently not related to any specific structural characteristic 
of the host country such as leve! of income per capita, size of the domestic 
market, natura!-resource endowment or population density. Neither is there 
any evident relation to the politica! structure or the general economie policy 
of the countrtes concerned. 
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Table 3. Export Processing Free Zones in developing countries, 1980. 
Country EPFZs in 
operation 
EPFZs 
planned or 
under 
development 
Country EPFZs in 
operation 
EPFZs 
planned or 
under 
development 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belize 
Brazil 
UR of Cameroon 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
South Korea 
Liberia 
Malaysia 
Malta 
Mauritius 
2 
1 
10 
1 
1 
Chile 
China1 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Dominican Rep. 
1 
3 
3 
4 
1 
2 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Philippines 
2 
1 
1 
3 
1 
12 
Dubai, United 
Arab Emirates 
El Salvador 
Egypt 
Fiji 
1 
4 
1 
1 
1 
Saint Lucia 
Samoa 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Sri Lanka 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Ghana 
Guatemala 
Haiti 
Honduras 
India 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 Sudan 
Syrian Arab Rep 
Taiwan2 
Thailand 
Tunisia 
3 
3 
2 
1 
1 
Indones ia 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kenya 
2 
1 
1 
1 ' 
Venezuela 
Zaire 
1 
1 
Notes and souraes: 
1
 zones (3) in operation in China in 1981 are listed in A. Basile and 
D. Germidis, Investing -in Eree Export Processing Zones, OECD, Paris, 1984, 
table 1, p. 22. Information on zones (4) set up in China in 1980 taken 
from South, The Third World Magazine, Number 60, October 1985 (South 
Special Report), pp. 75-83. 
2
 Listed in A. Basile and D. Germidis, op.cit., table 1, p. 22. 
Unless otherwise indicated, information taken from UNCTAD, Export Processing 
Free Zones in Developing Countries: Implications for Trade and Industrializa-
tion Policies, TD/B/C.2/211, 1983, tables I and II, pp. 32-34. 
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8. SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON REGIME TRANSFORMATION 
Protectionist countries may want to transform the trade and industrialization 
regime in order to reduce the anti-trade bias in production and to stimulate 
manufacturing industries to export. The need of such a transformation or adap-
tation of the regime does not necessarily follow from the requirements or in-
terests of the manufacturing sector itself but may also emerge from factors 
outside the sector. Exhaustion of the most obvious import-substitution possi-
bilities may bring about the need of adaptations in trade policy. Unintended 
side effects, inconsistencies and absurdities, arising from a complex and ex-
tensive regime of trade barriers, may necessitate policy reform.11 Chronic 
balanee-of-payments problems, accumulation of foreign debts and a high debt-
service ratio may also force a government to such adaptations. 
There is no simple change-óver from inward-oriented poli ei es towards more open 
policies, and conceiving this change-over as one decisive step in a one-way 
development process bypasses the economie and politica! complexity of policy 
reforms. Many attempts to alleviate the anti-trade bias in the regime have 
failed. Case histories show that periods of liberalization may be succeeded 
by a return to protectionist policies.12 
The aims of such policy reforms 'are to bring about (1) a more favourable ratio 
between the world market price, expressed in the domestic currency, and the 
domestic market price for tradables; (2) a more favourable ratio between the 
supply price of a country's exporters, expressed in foreign currency, and the 
supply price of foreign competitors. The first element relates to the reduc-
tion of the anti-trade bias in the incentive system; the second element re-
lates to increasing the competitiveness of domestic producers in the world 
market. 
The way transformation of the industrialization and trade regime is implemented 
differs from country to country. Nevertheless, some genera! observations can 
be made regarding the use of instruments and the direction of change. In most 
cases a change in regime is implemented by means of a large nomina! devaTua-
tion of the overvalued domestic currency, complemented by a set of measures 
that increases profitability and reduces costs in the export sector, such as 
tax exemptions, favourable import-licensing schemes, tariff-exemption schemes, 
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rebate schemes for tariffs paid on imported inputs, subsidized export 
credits and export-insurance programmes. Surveys of the many instruments 
involved are presented in studies by Donges, Balassaand Krueger.13 A 
summary of the evidence is presented by Keesing.lk A brief overview of 
export-promotion policies in East and South-East Asian countries is presented 
in van Dijck and Verbruggen.15 
To what extent an increase in export orientation takes place depends, apart 
from the immediate pecuniary effects of the measures, on the expectations of 
producers with respect to consistency in the future export consciousness of 
the government. Krueger finds that all developing countries that successfuliy 
penetrate world markets with manufactures have in common a realistic exchange 
rate and a consistent export-stimulation policy.16 According to Keesing, 
"... the celebrated success of so-called 'outward-looking' or 'export-promoting' 
strategies of development is built largely around the use of 'realistically' 
valued exchange rates .... Use of exchange rates in this way can even be 
viewed as a development strategy".17 
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9. THE WORLD BANK APPROACH TO REGIME TRANSFORMATION 
The World Bank has a long history of monitoring developing countries and 
formulating policy guidelines. lts country studies are a valuable source of 
information on the structure and performance of economies and the conduct 
of governments. Such studies have been used in this section. Lessons from 
the long experience of the World Bank in monitoring and investing in develop-
ment have been summarized by Baum and Tolbert. Countries with a successful 
record in export promotion have pursued policies that share most of the 
following elements: a realistic foreign-exchange rate; easy, duty-free access 
to imported inputs for exporters; competitive wage and labour policies; 
incentives to encourage foreign investment and other forms of cooperation 
with foreign companies; moderate and relatively uniform protection for domestic 
import-substituting industries; perceptive politica! leadership and constructive 
government intervention.18 These are also the elements highlighted in table 4 
in which recommendations for future policies are summarized. 
The World Bank's involvement in the process of policy formulation in developing 
countries has become more direct and critica! during the past few years. 
While the Bank's traditional rol e has been to invest borrowed funds in 
projects, its lending activities have become more diverse, comprehensive 
and policy-related since the introduction of sector loans and structural 
adjustment loan programs in 1979. These loans are not tied to a specific 
investment project but should facilitate poücy change and institutional 
reform in order to reduce the current account deficit, assist in meeting 
transitional costs of structural change and to induce additional foreign 
capita! inflow. Since repayments of external loans and interest payments 
require foreign exchange, programs for borrowing must be linked to an overall 
economie policy that guarantees an efficiënt allocation of externally financed 
investments and the generation of foreign exchange to service debts. 
The main purpose of structural adjustment loan programs is the strenghtening 
of the balance-of-payments position of a country, Four types of measures in 
these programs can be distinguished: restructuring of incentives, revision 
of public investment priorities, improvement in budget and debt management, 
and strengthening of institutions. A review of such programs for 11 devel-
oping countries shows the frequency of inclusion of the following measures 
in the areas of trade and industrialization policy.19 
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trade policy 
exchange-rate policy 
tariff reform and import liberalization 
export incentives and improved institutional support 
sector policy-industry 
incentive system 
institutional improvements and subsector programs 
frequency 
2 
4 
10 
Programs include measures such as the phasing out of quantitative import 
restrictions, the modification and reduction of tariff barriers to imports, 
export, subsidies and excise and sales taxes, and the simplification of 
administrative export procedures. 
Major elements of policy packages that aim at reducing the anti-trade bias 
in government policies are listed in an inventory of World Bank policy pre-
scription and recommendations in table 4. These recommendations are taken 
from World Bank country studies based on the findings of World Bank missions. 
The country studies deal with the country's economie performance in the past 
and its economie outlook, the structure and performance of the main sectors 
of the economy and economie policy. It goes without saying that the perform-
ance of the manufacturing sector cannot be seen in isolation from the rest 
of the economy and that the trade and industrialization policies are part and 
parcel of a much broader package of policies. The inventory presented here 
doesnot attempt to list in fuil all policy recommendations in the country 
studies but to present, in a stylized fashion, the main policy recommenda-
tions that are directly related to the liberalization and export performance 
of the manufacturing sector. 
The following countries are included in our inventory. 
Country Mission 's 
visit 
Report 
published 
Country Mission 's 
visit 
Report 
published 
Argentina 1983 1985 South Korea 1983 1984 
Bangladesh 1978 1979 Mauritius 1981 1983 
Brazil 1981 1983 Mexico 1976 1979 
Chile 1977 1980 Morocco 1978 1981 
China 1980 1983 Peru 1980 1981 
Colombia 1982 1984 Philippines 1979 1980 . 
Dominican Rep. 1976 1978 Thailand 1982 1984 
Ecuador 1983 1984 Uruguay 1978 1979 
Kenya 1978 1983 
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The list includes 17 developing countries with wide differences in structural 
characteristics such as level of economie development and industrialization, 
size of the domestic market, population density and natura!-resource endowment, 
as well as in economie poli ei es and performance at the time of the World Bank 
mission's visit. At the one extreme we find such countries as Brazil, China 
and Mexico with a diversified manufacturing sector which is predominantly 
oriented towards the large domestic market. At the other extreme are smal! 
(island)economies such as the Dominican Republic and Mauritius that are highly 
dependent on the international economy. 
Some countries in the sample experimented with a shock-wise opening-up of the 
economy during the 1970s. This holds in particular for Chile and Argentina. In 
Chile an essentially laissez-faire policy has been pursued since September 
1973. The government that took power at that time largely eliminated non-
tariff barriers and reduced tariffs drastically to a level which is lower 
than in any other developing country. In Argentina a "badly designed process 
of opening the economy" was started in the period 1978-1980.20 Next are a 
number of countries that are gradually moving towards an open industrializa-
tion regime, albeit not always in a fully consistent fashion over time. 
Countries characterized by a reduced anti-export bias in the system of in-
centives are Brazil, Colombia, South Korea, Thailand and Uruguay. 
We may also distinguish a number of countries with a typically dual structure 
of incentives for the manufacturing sector. Manufactured exports in such 
countries are generated by only a limited number of firms that operate under 
conditions clearly distinguishable from conditions under which most other firms 
operate that produce for the domestic market only, apart from some occasional 
private dumping practices. The most extreme form of such a dual system of in-
centives is the combination of an EPFZ with a highly protected domestic-market-
oriented industry. Cases in point are the Dominican Republic, Mexico, the 
Philippines, Morocco, Mauritius and China. In the Dominican Republic, the 
successful export industries were operating in the EPFZ in 'the period preceding 
the World Bank mission's visit. In Mexico, manufactured exports expanded "in 
spite of Mexico's overall policies".21 About half of the value of manufactured 
exports was generated in the special zone at the border with the USA. In many 
ways, export industries in the Philippines are enclave industries even if they 
do not operate in an EPFZ. the same goes for Morocco. In Mauritius the export 
Table 4. Inventory of World Bank recommendations to liberalize the trade regime and to stimul 
Country Exchange-rate 
policy 
Import 
policy 
Fiscal 
policy 
Factor-market 
policy 
In 
po 
Argentina Stabilize a 
realistic 
exchange rate. 
Allow temporarily 
duty-free imports 
of inputs for (in-
direct) exporters. 
Give tax rebates 
and drawbacks 
for (indirect) 
exporters. 
Give exporters 
preferential 
access to credit. 
Bangladesh Facilitate 
access to 
foreign ex-
change for 
exporters. 
Harmonize incen-
tives for non-
export and ex-
port industries, 
Facilitate finance 
to sustain fledgling 
export ventures. 
Stimulate investment 
.in export industries 
by tax and subsidy 
incentives. 
Brazil Devalue gradually 
the domestic 
currency in real 
terms. 
Reduce level of 
protection during 
achievement of 
real devaluation. 
Harmonize incen-
tives for non-
export and ex-
port industries. 
Chile 
China Increase import 
opportunities 
for exporters. 
Cancel indirect 
taxes and reduce 
profit mark-ups 
on domestic inputs 
used in exports. 
of 
an 
go 
Up 
tr 
no 
(Table 4 continued) 
Country Exchange-rate 
poli cy 
Import 
policy 
Fiscal 
policy 
Factor-market 
policy 
Inv 
pol 
Colombia Accelerate rate 
of devaluation: 
speed up crawl ing 
peg adjustments. 
Dismantle adminis-
trative controls: 
lift import-quota 
restrictions, 
relax import 
licensing. 
Red^ ice and equal- ' 
ize tariffs, re-
move special in-
centives to import 
capita! goods. 
Review labour 
legislation, 
especially re-' 
garding fringe 
benefits. 
Increase avail-
ability of capital 
funds for exporters. 
Pro 
for 
ves 
joi 
of 
and 
fir 
Dominican 
Republic 
Increase access 
to parallel 
market for 
foreign exchange. 
Liberalize imports 
(of packaging 
material) for ex-
port products. 
Reconsider the 
introduction of 
export-subsidies 
and its problem-
atic implications, 
Ecuador Maintain an 
appropriate 
real exchange 
rate. 
Allow duty-free 
imports for 
exporters. 
Reduce dispersion 
in the tariff 
structure. 
Repay domestic 
taxes in full 
to exporters. 
Improve access 
to credits for 
exporters. 
Kenya Implement system 
of compensated 
devaluation. 
Replace quantita-
tive restrictions 
by tariffs. 
Moderate and 
harmonize tariffs. 
Give temporarily 
export subsidies 
to equalize 
tariff incentives, 
Introducé programme 
of export credits 
and financial 
guarantees. 
Rea 
gov 
inv 
to 
to 
pay 
(Table 4 continued) 
Country Exchange-rate 
policy 
Import 
policy 
Fiscal 
policy 
Factor-market 
policy 
Inve 
pol 
South Korea Reduce non-tariff 
barriers. 
Trim tariffs. 
Contain wage costs 
in manufacturing 
and services. 
Auto 
prod 
met 
Imp 
duct 
and 
Upg 
prod 
Mauritius Speed-up adminis-
trative issuance 
of import licenses. 
Harmonize incen-
tives for non-
export and export 
industries. 
Develop an export-
credit-insurance 
scheme. 
Attr 
eign 
inve 
Mexico Avoid overvalua-
tion of exchange 
rate; adjust 
frequently in 
case of domestic 
inflation. 
Dismantle or 
1iberalize 
lieens ing system. 
Rationalize tariff 
system, reduce 
tariff rates to 
10-15 per cent on 
an average. 
Eliminate tariff 
exemptions for 
public-sector agen-
cies and for imports 
of capital goods. 
Allow duty-free 
imports of goods 
to be re-exported. 
Consolidate 
system of CEDIs 
(sales tax re-
imbursement). 
Create an effec-
tive system of 
drawbacks on 
import duties 
for export firms, 
Limit wage in-
creases to growth 
of productivity. 
Increase fl,exi-
bility of labour 
laws. 
Stim 
expo 
orie 
vest 
join 
(Table 4 continued) 
Country Exchange-rate 
policy 
Import 
policy 
Fiscal 
policy 
Factor-market 
policy 
Inve 
poli 
Morocco In the short term 
simplify and gener-
alize in-bond sys-
tem with tariff and 
tax-free imports 
for exporters. 
In the long term, 
rationalize the sys-
tem of import quo-
tas, tariffs and 
export subsidies. 
Lengthen period 
of exemption 
from business 
profit tax. 
Abolish "statis-
tical" export tax. 
Give direct export 
subsidies in the 
case of new 
products. 
Reduce costs of 
export credits 
by interest sub-
sidies and favour-
able maturities. 
Stim 
fore 
inve 
Peru Combine ration-
alization of 
exchange-rate 
policy with a 
reduction of 
tariffs and ex-
port subsidies. 
Accelerate tariff 
reductions. 
Restrict exceptions 
for infant industries 
to a limited number 
of industries and 
with clearly defined 
time limits. 
Attr 
eign 
ment 
stim 
join 
vent 
Philippines Reduce protection 
by the lowering of 
peak tariff rates 
and of tariffs on 
non-competing im-
ports. Reduce re-
dundancy in'tariffs. 
Lower tariffs to 
20-30 per cent on 
an average. 
Allow all export 
firms duty-free 
imports of raw mate-
rials and components 
Remove licensing by 
the Central'Bank. 
Substitute sales 
taxes for high 
tariffs on 
1uxury items. 
Improve credit pro-
vision of export 
industries. Create 
special credit fa-
cility for financing 
raw-material procure-
ment by export firms. 
Establish an export-
credit guarantee and 
insurance scheme. 
Reduce rates of 
short-term export-
f inancing f a c i l i t i e s . 
(Table 4 continued) 
Country Exchange-rate 
policy 
Import 
policy 
Fiscal 
policy 
Factor-market 
policy 
I 
po 
Thailand Continue ration-
alizatio.n of the 
tariff structure 
by narrowing the 
tariff band. 
E 
b 
ex 
i 
in 
st 
Uruguay Adjust the ex-
change rate 
timely and . 
appropriately. 
Accelerate reduc-
tion and harmoni-
zation of tariffs. 
Conditioned on the 
achievement of an 
appropriate exchange 
rate, reduce tax 
rebates. 
Sources: recommendations taken from the following World Bank'country studies: 
Argentina: Economie Memorandum, Volumes 1 and 2, 1985. 
Bangladesh: Current Trends and Development Issues, 1979. 
Brazil: Industrial Policies and Manufactured Exports, 1983. 
Chile: An Economy 'in Transition, 1980. 
China: Socialist Economie Development, Volumes I, II and III, 1983. 
Colombia: Economie Development and Policy under Changing Conditions, 1984. 
Dominican Republic: lts Maln Economie Development Problcms, 1978. 
Ecuador: An Agenda for Recovery and Sustained Growth, 1984. 
Kenya: Growth and Structural Change, Volumes I and II,' 1983. 
Korea: Development in a Global Context, 1984. 
Mauritius: Economie Memorandum: Recent Dcvolopmcnts and Prospccts, 1983. 
Mexico: Manufacturing Sector: Situation, Prospects and Policies, 1979. 
Morocco: Economie and Social Development Report, 1981. 
Peru: Major Development Policy Issues and Recommendations, 1981. 
Philippines: Industrial Development Strategy and Policies, 1980. 
Thailand: Managing Public Resources for Structural Adjustment, 1984. 
Uruguay: Economie Memorandum, 1979. 
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performance is entirely dominated by firms operating in the EPFZ. China 
only recently started a process of liberalization and created special export 
zones in the vicinity of Hong Kong and Macao. Finally, the list includes some 
countries where liberalization had barely started by the time of the World 
Bank mission's visit, as was the case in Bangladesh, Kenya, Ecuador and Peru. 
Bangladesh is a special case. Textile exports are of great importance to the 
country's export performance, but apart from the textile sector manufacturing 
industry hardly contributes to exports. 
In the inventory, we distinguish six areas of government intervention: 
exchange-rate policy, import policy, fiscal policy, factor-market policy, 
investment policy, and export-promotion policy. 
Again, it should be noted that only measures that are recommended in the direct 
context of trade liberalization and export stïmulation for the manufacturing 
sector are included in the inventory. 
The inventory reveals, on the one hand, the many dimensions of the complex 
process labelled "liberalization of the trade and industrialization regime". 
It shows, al bei-t indirectly, the labyrinth of the world of second- en next-
best policies. On the other hand, the inventory shows clearly and unequivo-
cally the "hierarchy in policies'", ranging from first-best to second- and 
next-best policies. Reviewing the policy recommendations in the World Bank 
country studies, we may distinguish the following priorities in the process 
of liberalization and rationalization of the incentive system. 
The incentive system should be neutral between domestic-market-oriented 
industries and export-oriented industries. 
Management of the balance of payments through exchange-rate adjustment is 
preferable to the application of specific (and non-automatic) import-control 
and export-stimulation measures. 
Across-the-board liberalization is preferable to selective liberalization for 
export industries only. 
Tariffs are superior to administrative control of imports. 
The dispersion in tariff rates should be limited. 
From the inventory of World Bank recommendations on regime transformation it 
follows directly that timely and appropriate adjustment of the exchange rate 
is seen to be the single most important device to manage the balance-of-
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payments position of the economy and to provide an unbiased incentive to 
domestic-market-oriented industry and export industry. In many of the coun-
tries under review, the overvalued domestic currencyhampers export production 
and, other things being equal, stimulates imports. Devaluation stimulates ex-
port production and enables a reduction in nomina! tariff rates without re-
ducing the net effective rate of protection for domestic-market-oriented in-
dustry. Compensated devaluation, i.e. the combination of devaluation and tar-
iff reduction, is the most frequently prescribed avenue to liberalization and 
export stimulation. Changes in effective rates of protection should, prefer-
ably, not be implemented shock-wise. Moreover, they should be announced wel! 
in advance to allow the process of industrial restructuring to proceed as 
smoothly as possible. To establish neutrality in the incentive system during 
the transition towards a more open regime, specific instruments may be applied 
- temporarily - to stimulate export industries. Export subsidies (preferably 
not on export values but on domestic value added in exports), tax rebates, and 
tax- and tariff-e^cemption schemes for export industries are frequently applied 
and recommended instruments. Major drawbacks of such instruments are that they 
do not give an automatic across-the-board incentive to export industries, re-
quire administrative control a.nd may turn out to be costly. In a world of 
second- of next-best policies efficiënt administrative support is essential 
for the incentive system to be effective as is stressed time and again in the 
recommendations. 
In view of the precarious balance-of-payments situation of many a developing 
country, priority is given to straightforward export promotion. Repeatedly, 
reports cal! for "aggressive" export-promotion programs, most clearly so 
in the country studies on Argentina, the Philippines and Colombia.22 Improved 
access to credits and the development of export-credit and insurance schemes 
are frequently suggested. Export-credit schemes entail a de facto subsidy of 
exports through lowered interest rates and, to a lesser extent, through fa-
vourable repayment terms. Export-financing facilities become more and more 
important in giving a supplier a competitive edge in world markets and are 
increasingly used by developing countries for export promotion.23 Development 
of export-supporting agencies, such as marketing and distribution agencies and 
trading houses, is another frequently suggested tooi to stimulate (infant) 
export industries. Promotion of export-oriented foreign investment is sug-
gested to diversify exports, acquire modern technology, upgrade the product 
mix, improve product quality and facilitate marketing. Only rarely is the 
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establishment of EPFZs recommended. Such a recommendation for a dual incentive 
structure is based on the expectation that more favourable poli ei es to expand 
exports are not feasible in the short term. Cases in^point are the Philippines 
(in the country study of 1976) and the Dominican Republ.ic.2" 
The recommendations are presented here in the quite rigid framework of an in-
ventory. As such, the inventory gives a clear overview of the steps to be 
taken to liberalize the economy and to stimulate manufactured exports. However, 
to appreciate fully the depth and width of the recommended policy changes and 
their possible impact, they should be seen against the background of a coun-
try' s structural characteristics, past economie performance, the characteris-
tics of the trade and industrialization policies actually pursued, and the 
mission's assessment of the necessity and feasibility of policy change in the 
future. In some cases, recommended changes in policy are a matter of fine-
tuning and are in line with the changes in government policies that are ac-
tually taking place. Chile is a case in point. No recommendations on Chile's 
trade and industrialization regime are included in the inventory since, ac-
cording to the mission's assessment, the policies actually pursued, which are 
essentially laissez-faire by nature, are to be continued. As stated in the 
report: "(i)n its broad outlines, the economie policy reforms introduced by 
the present Government are consistent with advice long offered Chile by the 
World Bank and other international institutions".25 In other cases the recom-
mendations imply a strong deviation from actual policies. An extreme example 
is the set of recommendations on Madagascar, not included in the inventory, 
where the recommended policy is a scenario for a more open economie develop-
ment completely different from the actual drive towards a more inward-oriented 
development.26 
Finally, attention should be paid to the implementation of policy reform and 
to the setting or atmosphere in which export stimulation is to take place 
since this dimension is not fully dealt with in the inventory itself. In 
recent World Bank studies special attention is paid to the rol e of economie 
atmosphere in the creation of a competitive economy. Although this dimension 
of regime transformation is definitely not new in economie literature, its 
actual relevance has been re-emphasized in studies deal ing with the rapid 
world-market penetration by some East-Asian economies such as Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan. Successful export performance and exploitation of comparative 
advantage is not merely due to "getting prices right" and even less to a 
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laissez-fa-ive attitude of government. The experience of countries successful 
in world-market penetration indicates that active government involvement and 
synergistic partnership between government and the private sector are part 
and parcel of the export drive. To assure an efficiënt functioning of the 
instruments listed earlier and an adequate response of the private sector 
to government policies, a stable and efficiënt government with a high politica! 
commitment to export stimulation and a synergistic partnership between the 
public and private sectors are required. These factors may be crucial elements 
of the "rather special social and political characteristics" that are behind 
the successfu! export performance of some East-Asian countries, as suggested 
by Chenery, Hofheinz and Calder.27 This implies that an explanation of a 
country's export performance may not be fully adequate when confined to 
purely "economie" factors only. Differences between countries in political 
and sociocultural factors may be additional variables to explain differences 
in the capacity to exploi't potential comparative advantage. Efficiency, 
stability and reliability of government policies have been stressed by 
Krueger and Keesing and are sometimes expücitly mentioned in the inventory.28 
Synergistic partnership as a factor that nas an impact on the performance of 
the manufacturing sector is, as such, not new in the literature. The classical 
literature on the import-substitution era frequently referred to it, be it 
in different terms. "Tailor-made protection" and "made-to-measure" interven-
tion can be conceived of as the result of a synergistic partnership between 
government and the private sector to protect the latter against import com-
petition. In the context of export promotion it implies institutionalized co-
operation, indicative planning, the creation of special agencies to stimulate 
exports and the formulation of export targets in the nationa! agenda. The 
Japanese and Korean approaches to export-conducive atmosphere creation are by 
now wel doeumented.29 Miyohei Shinohara and Toru Yanagihara stress the impor-
tance of consensus-making as a variable to explain Japan's industrial develop-
ment and export drive.3" In the case of South Korea, Kwang Suk Kim highlights 
the government's capability of controlling the private sector and of making 
it contribute to export performance by compulsion.31 
The review of policy proposals, presented here, shows in a representative way 
the World Bank approach to structural adjustment in developing countries. The 
review includes only a few low-income countries, but policy recommendations 
for such countries do not differ in an essential way from the recommendations 
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for middle-income countries. In the World Bank report Tcwavd Sustained 
Development in Süb-Sahavan- Afrn-oa the following recommendations are made. 
Prices rather than quantitative controls should be used to allocate resources. 
To stimulate efficiency in resource allocation and increase exports, protec-
tion for inefficiënt activities is to be reduced, devaluations in real terms 
are required in many cases and higher prices should be offered to exporters. 
Again, a realistic exchange rate and a more open trading regime are considered 
essential preconditions for future industrialization and successful regional 
integration.32 
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* This articie is the resuit of a study on Export-Oriented Industrialization 
and Economie Development in Developing Countries that has been undertaken 
at the Free University of Amsterdam. The study has been sponsored by the 
Dutch Minister of Development Cooperation. The fuil results of the author's 
contribution to this study have been published in Causes and Charaateristios 
of Export-Oriented Industrialization in Developing Countries, Free University 
Press, Amsterdam, 1986. 
The author is actually engaged as researcher at the Economie and Social 
Institute of the Free University of Amsterdam. 
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